Americans for a Successful Resolution in Iraq

We advocate fundamental changes in U.S. policy in Iraq that will promote the creation of a sovereign, peaceful Iraq AND will bring our troops home safely and quickly.

It is past time to face the reality that the American military occupation of Iraq is part of the problem, not the solution. Our forces are a continuing incitement to nationalist insurgency and regional anti-Americanism. We are locked in a battle against an insurgency that can be continually replenished and will fight to the end to get the United States out of its country. The election of an interim government does not change this dynamic, even as we hope that it heralds the beginning of a positive political transformation in Iraq.

The on-going cost of this operation to the Iraq people and its country is immense. Many tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians have lost their lives in the crossfire. The lack of security has brought reconstruction of most of this devastated country to a near standstill. Offensive operations in areas controlled by insurgents leave yet more destruction, displacement and misery in their wake. Crime and violence are so pervasive that it is hazardous for Iraqis to venture from home, let alone revive the country’s economic life or address the gathering health crises. The American military is not able to turn this situation around. Instead, its presence and its operations create every greater hostility and resentment, producing greater tolerance and support for the insurgency.

For Americans, the human and financial costs of the military occupation have far exceeded the Bush Administration’s projections, and are increasingly hard to bear. Over 1,300 U.S. servicemen and women have lost their lives, over 10,000 others have suffered serious combat injuries. Morale and performance are jeopardized as enlisted troops have seen their tours of duty repeatedly extended and members of the National Guard and Reserves have been inappropriately burdened. To date, Congress has appropriated $160 billion to pay for the war in Iraq, and the Administration has requested approximately an additional $80 billion, pushing the total cost thus far to nearly $240 billion. The monthly cost of the war – the “burn-rate” – is approximately $5 billion.

Nor is the US military occupation capable of facilitating the democratization of the country and return of full sovereignty. We are guardedly hopeful that the recent elections will prove to be the first step toward the establishment of a representative government capable of bringing stability, reconstruction and political transition to Iraq. There remain many uncertainties. But it is certain that the new government will fail if it is dependent and dominated by the United States. Clearly, a continuing, unwelcome military occupation by the U.S. makes it impossible for the new government to establish its credibility and to brig together Iraq’s different population groups. The leading Sunni Arab organizations, including most notably the Association of Muslim Scholars, have insisted that they will not engage with the government until the U.S. has agreed to a timetable in the near future for an end to the occupation. The most recent public opinion poll, conducted the third week of January by Abu Dhabi TV/Zogby International finds a large majority of both Shiite and Sunnis call for a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from their soil.

Meanwhile, the nascent Iraqi security forces who work under the American military and on whom the Pentagon has pinned great hopes for assuming responsibility for maintaining security, are high-priority and easy targets of the insurgents. We support the goal of putting Iraqis back in charge of their own security. But the Iraqi police and National Guard are failing to provide security because their association with the U.S. fatally compromises them. The daily and grisly death toll of the new recruits reveals the futility of the American strategy in Iraq. To the extent that the new Iraqi security forces are seen as “replacements” for U.S. soldiers – exactly the Pentagon’s strategy for bringing down U.S. troop levels – they will be seen as U.S. stooges and high priority targets of the insurgency. Only by clearly beginning to end the U.S. occupation can the Iraq army, policy, border patrol, law enforcement officers emerge as necessary and trusted elements of a sovereign country. Assistance with training and equipment from NATO, other international bodies, along with the U.S., is, of course, needed.

President Bush’s own National Intelligence Estimate, completed last summer but never declassified or briefed to the American public, forecast three possible scenarios that range from a persistent quagmire at best to a bloody civil war at worst. Classified CIA reports and briefings in December are reported to provide an updated assessment that is equally or even more pessimistic about developments in Iraq.

Given the near consensus forming around grim predictions of profound U.S. troubles in Iraq, the only practical and moral course of action is to fundamentally reverse course in Iraq, including a phased withdrawal of U.S. military forces. The United States can and should play a critical role in helping to reconstruct Iraq, re-start its economy, and create a representative, stable government. Indeed, the U.S. incurred moral, and in some cases, legal obligations to do so when it invaded and occupied a sovereign country. Effective U.S. help, however, is impossible so long as it remains a military occupier.

Are U.S. forces needed to prevent greater violence and civil war?

Some analysts warn that if the U.S. withdraws its troops, there is a risk that greater violence will erupt, perhaps leading to civil war. They ask: will insurgents simply seize upon the projected date of American withdrawal as the date they can launch an all-out assault without fearing American troops? The answer is that perhaps the leadership of the insurgency will try to take advantage of this U.S. policy, but that they are unlikely to be effective. The insurgency currently is effective because it can ally with nationalists among the population that strongly oppose the U.S. occupation and because it can count on a supportive, or at least largely tolerant Sunni population, that is deeply resentful and suspicious of the United States. With the end of the U.S. occupation – or even a clear process leading in predictable steps to an end to the occupation – the insurgency will lose much of its standing and resources.

Moreover, we do not advocate an abrupt withdrawal of all troops, without any accompanying policies to mitigate possible risks. Over the course of the year during which troops levels will decline, U.S. forces will be available to protect the population as needed. The difference is that the priority for our forces will be civilian protection, not the destruction of the insurgency, which we have seen is counterproductive. Moreover, U.S. troops should be withdrawal from highly visible, provocative positions so as not to offer themselves as targets.

And what of the risk of civil war? Yes, such a risk exists given the conflicting demands and needs of Iraq’s constituent groups and the high level of endemic violence. But it exists whether the U.S. military stays or not and, in fact, is probably increased by our presence and policies. The U.S. military occupation exacerbates sectarian violence, which is very unfortunately, on the rise. Our presence and policies attracts foreign Jihadists, particularly militant Islamists, who forge alliances with Iraqi Sunni nationalists. Together they attack the United States and the Iraqi government, which is perceived to be, with some justification, a Shiite government supported by the U.S. The conflict has thus assumed a Shiite against Sunni character. If the U.S. does not initiate such a gradual withdrawal and clearly signal it is not planning for an indefinite stay, the existing level of violence will continue unabated and probably continue to increase, as it has done over the past two years.

The international community, working together, can take steps to help mitigate the possibility of civil war. The most promising way to encourage constructive international involvement is to call an international conference, perhaps sponsored by the United Nations, to hammer out a plan to address the myriad of problems left in the wake of a U.S. military withdrawal. The United States should actively support such an effort. In particular, international cooperation is needed to ensure that neighboring states to not intervene in Iraq in reaction to developments inside the country. International efforts to seal borders, provide reconstruction assistance and humanitarian aide are all critical also. All Iraqi parties and their external Middle East sponsors and neighbors (Iran, Syria, Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) plus the U.S., Russia, and the E.U need to be at the table.

What would a phased withdrawal look like?

We advocate a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops according to a negotiated timetable, modified military operations and deployments, and a goal of a complete withdrawal by the end of 2005 as mandated by the UN Security Council authorization of foreign troops in Iraq. It is critical that the U.S. announce its unambiguous intention to end its military occupation in the near-term and to take immediate steps to initiate this process. We envision gradual reduction in troop levels along with their redeployment to less visible and less provocative places. Equally importantly, we urge that the military revise its operations. Its priority should be to protect civilians, not to destroy insurgents. To implement this shift in priorities, the military should strictly limit operations that endanger civilians, and should modify procedures governing arrests, treatment and prisoners and home searches. We do not advocate an abrupt withdrawal of all U.S. troops, which would create a security vacuum.

Need for an international conference

A violent, “failed state” and terrorist haven in Iraq is in no one’s interest. Although success is far from guaranteed, an international conference has potential to salvage this precarious situation. Most other states, including close U.S. allies, have refused or sharply limited their involvement in Iraq because they do not want to endorse or participate in a failed American war. However, in the changed context of an American withdrawal, we can expect a dramatic lessening of the international reluctance to commit resources, including peacekeepers and trainers. The conference could negotiate agreement on the vital collateral actions that would accompany a U.S. withdrawal, such as the introduction of a Stablizing Force, accelerated training and equipping of Iraqi security forces, an impartial process for adjudicating Sunni-Kurdish land claims, agreement to stop infiltration of fighters and armaments across borders, international cooperation on isolating the jihadist from the Baathist elements, and guarantees for reintegration of the latter – former war criminals excluded -- into Iraq’s new governing structure if they give up the fight and join the political process.

International assistance with reconstruction, humanitarian needs and economic aid, all of which are already on the international agenda, clearly remain critically important. An international conference convened in the context of a U.S. military withdrawal would facilitate increased international involvement and progress on these issues.

The sooner the U.S. takes steps to end its military occupation, the more constructive its reconstruction and political initiatives will be and the greater the likelihood that nascent Iraqi leaders and other international actors can also act constructively to promote Iraqi security, sovereignty and democracy.

Phased Withdrawal of U.S. Military Forces

Do the Right Thing: Time to Come Home

The newly elected Iraqi government will gain the credibility and support it needs to govern when the Bush Administration takes initial steps that unambiguously indicate a beginning to the end of the U.S. military occupation. Only as the Iraqi government assumes responsibility for its own security will the insurgency’s strength be sapped. We support a gradual withdrawal of troops according to a negotiated timetable, modified military operations and deployments, and a goal of the complete withdrawal by the end of 2005 as mandated by the UN Security Council authorization of foreign troops in Iraq. The following lays out a plan for a successful resolution in Iraq.

First, the U.S. should begin a gradual, phased decrease in numbers rather than augmenting the size of the force.

It should commit to a withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces under its command by the time the UN mandate expires. The current UN resolution provides for expiration of the mandate for foreign forces to coincide with elections planned for December 2005, following the negotiation of a new and permanent constitution.

A status of forces agreement should be signed with the newly elected government, with clear lines of operational command and control, coordination with Iraqi authorities and a timetable for withdrawal. Such a timetable is a central plank of United Iraqi Alliance, the coalition that dominates the newly elected legislature. It is critical if the newly elected government is to have the credibility and support it needs to govern.

A status of forces The Administration should re-deploy troops away from highly visible or provocative positions and should modify its operations. The military's priority should be to protect civilians, not to destroy insurgents. To implement this shift in priorities, the military should strictly limit operations that endanger civilians and should modify procedures governing arrests, treatment of prisoners and home searches.

Second, the Administration should formally and unequivocally declare that it will not maintain a permanent military presence or military bases in Iraq.

Third, the Administration should take concrete steps to gather international support.

The U.S. should agree to an international conference in the near future to address the myriad of problems – notably, but not exclusively security issues – left in the wake of a U.S. military withdrawal.

The Security Council should authorize and encourage the creation of an international stabilization force to assist the Iraqi authorities with security and training of Iraqi forces.

The phased withdrawal of U.S. troops should be accompanied by greater international involvement in Iraq’s transition and accelerated U.S. and international financial investment in the reconstruction of Iraq.